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Dizzy Heights and
Occupiers’ Liability
Three recent cases have sought to clarify the
extent of an occupier’s duty of care owed to
trespassers under the Occupiers’ Liability
Act 1984. In two of these cases, liability was
denied largely because the relevant danger
had arisen from the trespasser’s own
activities as opposed to the actual state of
the premises. In the third case, the occupier
was held to be in breach of the duty of care
imposed under the 1984 Act because the
property itself was inherently dangerous
despite the trespasser (a 12 year old boy)
being engaged in dangerous behaviour.
The 1984 Act
Section 1(1)(a) of the Act makes clear that
the relevant duty of care owed by the
occupier to trespassers is confined to any risk
of suffering personal injury on the premises
“by reason of any danger due to the state of
the premises or to things done or omitted to
be done on them.” Section 1(3) provides that
a duty is owed to the trespasser if the
occupier:
 is aware of the danger or has reasonable
grounds to believe that it exists (s.1(3)(a))
 knows or has reasonable grounds to
believe that the trespasser is in the vicinity
of the danger concerned or that he may
come into the vicinity of the danger
(s.1(3)(b)), and
 the risk is one against which, in all the
circumstances of the case, he may
reasonably be expected to offer the other
some protection (s.1(3)(c))
The duty is to take such care as is reasonable
in all the circumstances to see that the
trespasser does not suffer injury on the
premises by reason of the danger concerned.
The obligation to take reasonable care may,
in appropriate circumstances, be discharged
by taking such steps as are reasonable to give
warning of the danger or to discourage
persons from incurring the risk.
Adults
In Siddorn v. Patel [2007] EWHC 1248 (QB),
the claimant sought damages from her
landlord for injuries sustained whilst dancing
on a garage roof. The claimant was one of
the tenants of a first floor flat which adjoined
a garage, which had a flat roof and two
skylights covered by corrugated perspex. The
only means of access from her flat onto the
roof (which did not form part of her tenancy)
was through a window within the flat. During
a party at the flat, the claimant was among
several people who had climbed out onto the
roof and, whilst dancing around one of the
skylights, she inadvertently stepped onto the
perspex cover and fell though it. Her claim
against the landlord for negligence and
breach of duty of care under s.1(1)(a) of the
1984 Act alleged that the skylight was unsafe
(in not having a suitable cover) and that no
adequate warning had been given of the
unsafe condition of the roof. In response, the
landlord argued that the roof did not come
within s.1(1)(a) because the danger to the
claimant had arisen from her own activity in
dancing around the perspex cover without
looking carefully at what she was doing.
Not surprisingly, the court rejected the
claimant’s argument. The duty of care under
the 1984 Act could only arise if the danger
referred to in s.1(1)(a) was due to the state of
the premises and not a claimant’s activity.
There was nothing to suggest that the cover
Professor Mark Pawlowski examines recent
case law on the distinction between “activity”
dangers and “premises” dangers under the
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was unsuitable or in a state of disrepair. The
decision accords with a number of earlier
authorities which establish the proposition
that the 1984 Act is not engaged where the
injury is sustained because the claimant
chooses to engage in an activity with inherent
dangers and not because the premises are in
a dangerous state. In Donoghue v. Folkestone
Properties Ltd [2003] QB 1008, for example,
a young adult had dived into a harbour and
struck his head on an underwater pile. Lord
Phillips (at 1019) observed:
“There are some features of land that are
not inherently dangerous but which may
tempt a person on the land to indulge in
an activity which carries a risk of injury.
Such activities include cliff-climbing,
mountaineering, skiing, and hang-gliding
by way of example. It does not seem to
me that a person carrying on such an
activity can ascribe to the ‘state of the
premises’ an injury sustained as a result of
a mishap in the course of carrying on the
activity – provided of course that the
mishap is not caused by an unusual or
latent feature of the landscape.”
Similarly, in Tomlinson v. Congleton Borough
Council [2004] 1 AC 46, a young person
sustained severe injuries by diving into a
stretch of shallow water. Lord Hoffmann said
(at para. 27):
“[The claimant] was a person of full
capacity who voluntarily and without any
pressure or inducement engaged in an
activity which had inherent risk. The risk
was that he might not execute his dive
properly and so sustain injury. Likewise, a
person who goes mountaineering incurs
the risk that he might stumble or misjudge
where to put his weight. In neither case
can the risk be attributed to the state of
the premises. Otherwise any premises can
be said to be dangerous to someone who
chooses to use them for some dangerous
activity.”
Most recently, in Maloney v. Torfaen County
Borough Council [2005] EWCA Civ 1762, the
claimant sustained injuries when he stumbled
over an unfenced retaining wall and fell down
a sloping grass bank onto a concrete floor of
a pedestrian subway. He was drunk at the
time of the accident. There had been two
previous incidents involving people falling
down the slope, in particular an incident that
had occurred less than one month prior to
the claimant’s accident, where the injured
party had suffered a fatal fall. The Court of
Appeal, agreeing with the trial judge,
concluded that the accident had occurred as
a result of a danger due to the state of the
premises. Interestingly, the contrary
argument, namely, that the accident was
caused by the claimant’s “own foolhardy
actions . . . when drunk”, was treated as
being relevant only to the issue of
contributory negligence and not causation. In
this connection, the trial judge had found the
claimant two-thirds contributory negligent for
what had happened. In the end result,
however, the council was absolved of liability
on appeal because it had not been shown
that it knew (or had reasonable grounds to
believe) that the claimant might have come
into the vicinity of the danger within the
meaning of s.1(3)(b) of the 1984 Act. 
Children 
Two recent cases are of particular interest. 
In Keown v. Coventry Healthcare NHS Trust
[2006] EWCA Civ 39, an 11 year old boy 
had been climbing the underside of a fire
escape at the trust’s hospital premises when
he fell to the ground and was badly injured.
In defence, the trust argued that the fire
escape was not itself dangerous and that any
danger was due to the boy’s activity on the
premises. Longmore L.J. concluded that
premises which were not dangerous from the
point of view of an adult could, nevertheless,
be dangerous for a child. The question was
one of fact and degree and much would
depend on the age of the child and his ability
to recognise the danger. Thus, “injury
suffered by a toddler crawling into an empty
and derelict house could be injury suffered
by reason of a danger due to the state of the
premises” whereas injury suffered by an adult
in the same circumstances would probably
warrant a different conclusion: ibid, para. 12.
The same could be said of banisters or
railings with spaces wide enough to allow
only a child’s head to be trapped between
them. However, a child’s choice to indulge in
a dangerous activity could not be ignored
simply because he was a child. In the instant
case, the boy was 11 years old. Moreover, he
was aware of the risk of falling and knew that
what he was doing was dangerous. In these
circumstances, the relevant danger could not
be said to arise from the state of the premises
– it was clearly the result of what the boy had
deliberately chosen to do. In particular, it was
apparent that there was nothing inherently
wrong with the fire escape in the sense of
having a physical defect or structural
deficiency. 
Interestingly, the court went on to consider
the trust’s potential liability had the fire
escape been found to be inherently
dangerous. In these circumstances, the court
intimated that the claimant could have
brought himself either within s.1(3)(a) of the
1984 Act (because the trust knew that the
fire escape was unguarded and unfenced) or
s.1(3)(b) (since the trust knew that children
played in the vicinity of the unguarded or
unfenced fire escape). The court doubted,
however, whether the claimant could have
succeeded under s.1(3)(c) because it would
not be reasonable to expect the trust to offer
protection from the risk. According to
Longmore L.J., if such protection were found
to be appropriate in relation to a normal fire
escape, occupiers would also be required to
offer the same protection from falling from
drain pipes, balconies, roofs, windows and
trees on land. This would be taking things too
far.
The decision in Keown may be contrasted
with the earlier case of Young v. Kent County
Council [2005] EWHC 1342 (QB) involving a
young boy, aged 12, who had climbed onto a
flat roof of a school building in order to
retrieve a football. He had climbed onto the
roof using the flue of an extractor fan
attached to the side of the building and was
injured when he deliberately jumped up and
down on a skylight and fell through it. The
skylight was brittle and, consequently,
inherently dangerous for a young child. The
judgment of Morison J. suggests that the
danger was attributable to the state of the
roof itself rather than the claimant’s own
activity in climbing onto it and jumping onto
the skylight. The council knew that children
regularly climbed the flue onto the roof and
there was a low cost solution to the problem,
which involved fencing off the area. For these
reasons, therefore, there had been a clear
breach of duty under the 1984 Act. The
child’s own mischievous behaviour (i.e., in
climbing onto the roof and jumping on the
skylight) was characterised as going to the
issue of blame in assessing his contributory
negligence. On this point, the claimant’s
damages were reduced by 50 per cent to
reflect his responsibility for the accident.
In the course of his judgment, Morison J.
intimated that the claim would have failed
had the claimant not been a child, since the
danger would not then have posed a
sufficient risk of causing injury to an adult
trespasser. In this connection, the Siddorn
case, referred to above, confirms that
different factors will operate where the court
is concerned with an adult intruder. In
Siddorn, the case was characterised as
involving an “activity danger” as opposed to a
“premises danger”. In particular, the court
took into account the fact that the claimant
(and her friends) were grown up, sensible
people who had gone outside onto the roof
when it was dark and when they were not
entirely sober. Essentially, the accident had
occurred as a result of the claimant dancing
around the skylight without taking proper
care. 
Conclusion
Several conclusions can be drawn from the
case law. It is apparent that different
considerations will apply depending on
whether the trespasser is an adult or child. In
the case of an adult, the court is unlikely to
be sympathetic where the injury has been
caused because the claimant has chosen to
indulge in an activity involving inherent
dangers. In these circumstances, assuming
the premises contain no latent or unusual
dangers, the claim is almost invariably bound
to fail. 
Child trespassers may also deliberately court
the risk of injury associated with a particular
feature of the premises, which may be
Occupiers’ Liability
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dangerous to them but not adults. Here, the
age of the trespasser may be relevant in
determining whether the danger is
attributable to the state of the premises.
Although a flat roof is not by itself a danger
simply because a young child could fall off it,
a lattice walkway which might trap a toddler’s
foot may be considered inherently dangerous
to very small children. As Longmore L.J.
observed in Keown, the question is one of
fact and degree based on all the
circumstances of the case and, although in
some cases the child trespasser may have no
capacity for discernment at all, it does not
follow that the premises must always be
made safe for very small children. As Lord
M’Laren observed in the Scottish case of
Stevenson v. Glasgow Corporation (1908) SC
1034, at 1039:
“In a town, as well as in the country, there
are physical features which may be
productive of injury to careless persons or
to young children against which it is
impossible to guard by protective
measures . . . Now, as the common law is
just the formal statement of the results
and conclusions of the common sense of
mankind, I come without difficulty to the
conclusion that precautions which have
been rejected by common sense as
unnecessary and inconvenient are not
required by the law.” 
In accordance with this principle, it has been
held that a person who owns a mountain in
the vicinity of a town is not required to fence
it off in case small children frequent it: Simkiss
v. Rhhonda Borough Council (1983) 81 LGR.
460. Moreover, in child cases, as in cases
involving adults, the relevance of the
claimant’s choice to indulge in a dangerous
activity cannot be ignored. Thus, the court
will find little sympathy for the child who has
sufficient capacity to recognise both the
danger of what he is doing and the risk of
injuring himself. This is made clear in Keown,
where the Court of Appeal was able to
characterise the boy as having the attributes
of an adult in making a genuine choice to
engage in a dangerous activity. As stated in
the current edition of Winfield & Jolowicz on
Tort, 2006, 17th ed., at p. 419: 
“an adult trespasser or even a child with
sufficient understanding who takes a risk
which should be obvious to him cannot
complain that the occupier did not take
more rigorous steps to discourage his
folly”. 
The recent cases, however, reveal a
significant divergence in approach in
determining the legal consequences of
claimant culpability. In Siddorn and Keown,
the claimant’s blame precluded him from
satisfying the threshold requirement
contained in s.1(1)(a) of the 1984 Act. This
meant that the claim in both cases failed in
limine. By contrast, in Young and Maloney,
the issue of the claimant’s misbehaviour (or
folly) was treated as a matter relevant only to
the issue of contributory negligence. Indeed,
in Maloney, Laws L.J. went so far as to
denounce the council’s argument on
causation as one of pure semantics and
metaphysics. In his view, the argument was
simply one which concerned the degree of
the claimant’s responsibility for what had
happened. As such, it was better dealt with as
an argument for reducing damages. 
The fact that there is no specific reference to
the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence)
Act 1945 in the 1984 (or 1957) Occupier’s
Liability Act has not, of course, deterred the
courts from applying the principle of
contributory negligence in determining claims
under both statutes – a trend which (rightly
or wrongly) now appears set to continue in
cases concerning claimant activity which
involves inherent risks of personal injury.  
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